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Effects of ignorance and information on judgments and decisions
Peter Ayton∗ Dilek Önkal† Lisa McReynolds‡
Abstract
We compared Turkish and English students’ soccer forecasting for English soccer matches. Although the Turkish
students knew very little about English soccer, they selected teams on the basis of familiarity with the team (or its
identified city); their prediction success was surprisingly similar to knowledgeable English students—consistent with
Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s (1999; 2002) characterization of the recognition heuristic. The Turkish students made
forecasts for some of the matches with additional information—the half-time scores. In this and a further study, where
British students predicting matches for foreign teams could choose whether or not to use half-time information, we
found that predictions that could be made by recognition alone were influenced by the half-time information. We
consider the implications of these findings in the context of Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s (2002, p. 82) suggestion that
“. . . no other information can reverse the choice determined by recognition” and a recent more qualified statement
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011) indicating that two processes, recognition and evaluation guide the adaptive selection
of the recognition heuristic.
Keywords: recognition heuristic, judgmental forecasting, inference, heuristics.
1 Introduction
How does knowledge affect judgment and decision-
making? While much judgment research has considered
the role of expertise, Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002)
have made the startling claim that, under certain circum-
stances, ignorance can benefit judges attempting to make
inferences from their knowledge. For example, Gold-
stein and Gigerenzer (2002) asked both American and
German students which is the bigger city: San Anto-
nio or San Diego? Sixty-two percent of the Americans
correctly named San Diego—but 100% of the German
students were correct. All of the German students had
heard of San Diego but only about half had heard of San
Antonio. Half of the German students would therefore
be able to apply a recognition heuristic—if you recog-
nise one and not the other, pick the city you recognise.
As people usually hear about the bigger cities of foreign
countries before the smaller ones—i.e., recognition cor-
relates with the criterion being predicted—this cue will
have some validity. Because the American students had
heard of both cities they couldn’t utilise this cue and had
to rely on other, apparently less valid, cues. In terms of
accuracy, it seems that, when it comes to using knowl-
edge to make inferences, less can sometimes mean more.
We are grateful to Ben Newell, Ulrich Hoffrage, Julian Marewski,
Dan Goldstein and Rüdiger Pohl for their helpful comments on an ear-
lier draft of this manuscript.
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Specifically, when the validity of the recognition cue ex-
ceeds the validity of the knowledge that can be applied
when both items are recognised, a “less is more” effect is
predicted.
To corroborate this “less is more” effect, Goldstein and
Gigerenzer (2002) administered two quizzes to 52 Uni-
versity of Chicago students—one about the biggest 22
German cities and one about the biggest 22 American
cities. Each quiz was comprised of 100 randomly se-
lected pairs of the biggest 22 cities for the country. They
found that the American students were slightly more ac-
curate about German cities than American cities. Further-
more, Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) cited Hoffrage
(1995; see also Hoffrage, 2011) who apparently found
that German students were slightly more accurate (al-
beit non-significantly) at making decisions about Amer-
ican cities than about German cities. Despite a lifetime
of experience and learning about the cities in one’s na-
tive country it seems that one can be more accurate when
making decisions about the cities in a country that is con-
siderably less familiar. Since these initial experiments,
further research (Beaman, Smith, Frosch, & McCloy,
2010; Hoffrage, 2011; Katsikopoulus, 2010; Smithson,
2010) has extended our understanding of the conditions
when a less-is-more effect may occur.
In another experiment to confirm that the recognition
heuristic predicted inferences Goldstein and Gigerenzer
(2002) found that subjects adhered to the predictions of
the recognition heuristic on 90% of the occasions that it
was applicable and concluded that the recognition heuris-
tic captured the vast majority of inferences. The more
381
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 6, No. 5, July 2011 Effects of ignorance and information 382
general theoretical point that Goldstein and Gigerenzer
(2002) drew from these demonstrations is that a very sim-
ple one-reason heuristic using very limited knowledge
can make surprisingly accurate decisions. Even igno-
rance can sometimes be helpful because a simple men-
tal heuristic like the recognition heuristic operates so as
to take advantage of the structure of information to make
good inferences. In particular, the recognition heuristic is
successful when ignorance, specifically a lack of recog-
nition, is systematically rather than randomly distributed,
that is, when it is strongly correlated with the criterion.
Of particular interest to us here is Goldstein and
Gigerenzer’s (2002) suggestion that the recognition
heuristic uses a noncompensatory rule. Even when other
information about a recognized alternative is available, it
never overrides the weight placed on simple recognition:
“If one object is recognized and the other is not, then the
inference is determined; no other information about the
recognized object is searched for and, therefore, no other
information can reverse the choice determined by recog-
nition” (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 82).1
Consistent with their suggestion that the recogni-
tion heuristic utilises a non-compensatory decision rule,
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) reported evidence that
use of the recognition cue was unaffected by the presence
of other conflicting information. We give a more detailed
account of their study in the general discussion but, in
short, they taught their respondents that cities with soc-
cer teams were bigger than those without in 78% of pos-
sible city pairings. Yet, when confronted with a choice
between a city they recognised and knew did not have a
soccer team and one they did not recognise but that might
have a soccer team, respondents chose the recognised city
in 92% of the pairs. Thus, additional diagnostic informa-
tion about soccer teams and city sizes had no measurable
impact on decisions where the recognition heuristic was
applicable.
A number of subsequently published studies clearly
show that recognition, at least in a general sense, plays
a role in prediction (e.g. Andersson, Edman & Ekman,
2005; Reimer & Katsikopoulos, 2004; Serwe & Frings,
2006) including for soccer matches (Pachur & Biele,
2007). These studies did not test the non-compensatory
use of recognition2—critical for distinguishing the recog-
nition heuristic from similar but distinct proposals such as
the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973),
which attribute judgment to the relative ease of retrieval,
1In Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s (2011) discussion of “Misunder-
standing #2” (p. 107) they clarify their position that the Recognition
heuristic ignores cues but not information in general, such as infor-
mation concerning criterion values or the recognition validity (but see
Newell’s [2011] doubts about this distinction).
2Pachur and Biele’s study included evaluation of a compensatory
model (TALLY) but did not test if additional information compensated
recognition.
or the fluency heuristic (Schooler & Hertwig, 2005),
which assumes the most fluently processed item has the
highest criterion value.
Nevertheless other studies have challenged the non-
compensatory use of recognition. For example Newell
and Shanks (2004) found in two cue-learning experi-
ments that people did not place any special status on
recognition. Most of their subjects learned to use
recognition-based information when it was a good predic-
tor and to essentially ignore it when it was a poor predic-
tor. They found little evidence that recognition is treated
any differently from other cues in the environment.
Note that, although these results show that laboratory-
induced recognition may be overruled by “given” infor-
mation (supplied by the experimenter), they do not show
that natural (pre-experimental) recognition can be over-
ruled by information drawn from memory. In their recent
review of research into the recognition heuristic Gigeren-
zer and Goldstein (2011) discuss what they identify as
“Misunderstanding #3” (pp. 107–108) and emphasise that
studies focusing on inferences from given information or
experimentally induced recognition are beyond the do-
main of the recognition heuristic.3
Newell and Shanks’s (2004) study and others that have
tested the non-compensatory use of recognition (Oppen-
heimer, 2003; Newell & Fernandez, 2006; Bröder &
Eichler, 2006; Pohl, 2006; Richter & Späth, 2006) have
been criticised by Pachur, Bröder & Marewski (2008)
who argued that most of the studies testing the non-
compensatory use of recognition used experimental sit-
uations that differ in potentially critical ways from the
situations for which Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) for-
mulated the heuristic. According to Pachur et al. (2008,
and also Pachur & Hertwig, 2006) an ideal test of the
recognition heuristic uses natural cue knowledge, rather
than teaching it in the same laboratory setting in which
choices are elicited—a failing of even Goldstein and
Gigerenzer’s test of non-compensatory cue use—and nat-
ural (pre-experimental) recognition—a failing of Newell
and Shanks’s two cue-learning experiments. Moreover,
according to Pachur et al., research should test cases
where recognition is a good predictor of the criterion and
also preclude the possibility that knowledge other than
cue knowledge could inform decisions—conclusive cri-
terion knowledge (e.g., knowing that a recognized city
is very small and so guessing that another unrecognized
city is bigger) could allow decision makers to make judg-
ments without engaging in the inductive inference that
Goldstein and were theorizing about.
3Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s (2002) paper reported experimental
tests of the recognition heuristic that used laboratory-induced recog-
nition and information from “givens” (with no caveats signalling any
theoretical improprieties in so-doing) which may have contributed to
Misunderstanding #3.
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The experiments presented here investigate how peo-
ple use recognition and are exempt from the issues raised
by Pachur et al.—although, like Goldstein and Gigeren-
zer (2002), we do test the impact of information from
“givens”, namely presented information rather than in-
formation drawn from memory. While this issue was not
referred to by Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002), it was
mentioned in Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996), which
first introduced the recognition heuristic. It is further em-
phasized by Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2011), who iden-
tify the presumption that the recognition heuristic applies
to inferences from “givens” as a misconception and de-
scribe tests of the recognition heuristic using inferences
from given information as going “beyond the domain of
the recognition heuristic”. Although their own test of the
impact of conflicting information tested subjects’ use of
given information and an experimenter-supplied cue va-
lidity (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) it did not provide
what Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2011) describe as cue
information about unrecognized objects—which may be
why Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) made no reference
to the notion that their own test was beyond the domain of
the recognition heuristic. Indeed they concluded: “This
result supports the hypothesis that the recognition heuris-
tic was applied in a noncompensatory way” (p. 83).
In our first study we examined the judgmental pre-
dictions of two different groups of subjects who, like
the American and German students studied by Gold-
stein and Gigerenzer, would be expected to have different
knowledge of a domain. This study—conducted in 1995,
long before we read about the recognition heuristic—was
cited by Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) as, rather fortu-
itously we must admit, it illustrated the surprising benefit
of ignorance for judgment. We studied Turkish and En-
glish students’ predictions of English soccer matches. We
expected the Turkish subjects to have very little knowl-
edge of the domain while the British subjects would have
a good deal of knowledge. Although predicting soccer
matches is not quite the same as making inferences about
city sizes, we were able to test the accuracy of subjects’
predictive inferences by comparing the forecasts with the
outcomes of the games. Given the Turkish subjects’ very
limited knowledge of English soccer, we envisaged that
relative familiarity with the names of the English cities
and towns that often make up the names of soccer clubs
might very often be their only basis for making forecasts.
So, although we did not have the recognition heuristic
in mind when we designed this study, we measured sub-
jects’ familiarity with city names—including those for
which they had no familiarity at all—in order to exam-
ine the relationship between this variable and their fore-
casts. We were also able to study the effect of pro-
viding additional diagnostic information on the Turkish
subjects’ judgments. After they made their initial fore-
casts we provided them with the half-time scores of the
matches to investigate whether their forecasts with addi-
tional information reflected any integration of the addi-
tional information in their judgment. We note here that,
as we discuss in more detail below, an objection to this
study is that it goes beyond the domain of the recogni-
tion heuristic because, in providing the half-time scores,
we provide what Gigerenzer & Goldstein (2011) describe
as cue information about unrecognized objects (Gigeren-
zer & Goldstein, 2011)—which Goldstein and Gigeren-
zer (2002) did not do.
2 Experiment 1
We tested the abilities of subjects to make forecasts about
the 32 matches that comprise the third round of the En-
glish Football Association trophy (F.A. cup).
2.1 Method
All subjects were presented with a list of the 32 soccer
matches drawn for the 1994 English F.A. cup 3rd round.
The F.A. cup is the major knockout tournament for En-
glish soccer clubs. Many hundreds of soccer teams enter
this tournament and compete through preliminary rounds
to reach the final stages of the competition; the draw for
the 3rd round is the first occasion when the country’s top
professional teams enter the contest. As teams are ran-
domly paired, famous clubs can be drawn against less
well-known lower clubs and occasionally even very ob-
scure amateur teams who have managed to reach the lat-
ter stages.
Subjects were instructed to select the team that they
thought would win each match and then rate their confi-
dence in their forecast on a 50–100% scale. After mak-
ing judgments for all the matches they were asked to state
how many of their 32 forecasts they expected to be cor-
rect. Before making their forecasts, the Turkish subjects
completed a questionnaire where for each of the men-
tioned teams they rated their degree of familiarity with
the name of the team on a 7-point scale (where 1=no
familiarity at all, 7= very high familiarity). Given their
very limited knowledge of English soccer we hypothe-
sised that relative familiarity with the names of the En-
glish towns might very often be their only basis for mak-
ing forecasts.
As Turkish subjects made their forecasts after most
of the games had actually taken place, we were able to
present these subjects with the half-time scores of most
of the matches to serve as an additional cue.4 Accord-
4We assumed (safely as it turned out) that the Turkish subjects would
not know the results of these matches and so could not use knowledge
of results to make their predictions. The English fans were tested be-
fore the matches were played and we did not examine their reaction to
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Table 1: Forecasting Performance (Experiment 1). Numbers are group medians of subjects’ mean scores.
Forecasts Proportion correct
Judged proportion
correct
Mean confidence Overconfidence
Turkish 62.5% 62.5% 67.2% 4.5%
Turkish (with
half-time scores)
60.0% 68.8% 69.5% 9.0%
British 65.6% 56.3% 70.1% 5.2%
ingly the Turkish subjects then repeated their forecasts
for the matches with the additional half-time score cue
and again rated their confidence in their forecast on a 50–
100% scale.
54 British students and 50 Turkish students made
forecasts for all 32 English F.A. cup 3rd round soccer
matches. The British subjects were recruited contingent
on a stated interest in soccer and successful completion
of a short quiz that probed knowledge of the outcome of
the previous season—respondents not interested in soc-
cer or not successfully completing the quiz were not re-
cruited. The Turkish subjects were recruited without
these requirements. Following their predictions for all
the matches the Turkish subjects gave predictions for 19
of the matches with the half-time results. We removed
three Turkish respondents who often rated their forecast
confidence less than .50. Other data were missing due
to some subjects omitting some familiarity ratings and/or
predictions.
2.2 Results
In developing the case for the recognition heuristic Gold-
stein and Gigerenzer (1999, 2002) discussed our experi-
mental data—previously only available in an unpublished
manuscript (Ayton & Önkal, 1997). As they reported, we
found that, despite very limited knowledge, the Turkish
students had a surprising ability to forecast the English
soccer matches. Table 1 shows that the Turkish students
correctly forecast 62.5% of the matches; although inferior
to the 65.6% success rate of the British students (Mann-
Whitney U=1053; p=.052), the difference is small and
not (quite) statistically significant.
The familiarity ratings confirm our assumption that the
Turkish subjects were largely ignorant about the English
soccer teams. In 82% of the 1036 total cases (subjects x
matches), Turkish subjects had no familiarity at all with
either just one (n=662) or both (n=184) of the UK teams
(or the city that often makes up part of English soccer
team names)—many also spontaneously protested their
ignorance during the testing.
additional information.
To test for the application of the recognition heuristic,
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) examined subjects’ de-
cisions where one item was recognised and the other item
was not recognised at all. Accordingly, we similarly stud-
ied the association between rated familiarity and fore-
casts. Table 2 presents the data from our experiment—
collated so that we can consider the impact of rated fa-
miliarity on forecasts for the 662 cases where subjects
forecast a match involving one team (or the city name
that often makes up part of English soccer team names—
e.g. “Manchester United”) that they indicated they were
totally unfamiliar with and one team where they indicated
at least some familiarity.
Table 2 shows that, when forecasting a match involving
one team that was not at all familiar and another team that
was rated as familiar to some degree, the Turkish students
selected the familiar team on a very high proportion of
occasions. As Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) reported,
our data are consistent with the use of the recognition
cue—among the pairs of soccer teams in which subjects
rated one team as completely unfamiliar and the other as
familiar to some degree, they chose the familiar team in
627 (95%) of 662 cases. Plainly, familiarity is an influen-
tial cue as well as an effective cue.
2.2.1 Impact of half-time scores
The performance of the Turkish respondents did not im-
prove with the additional half-time score information (Ta-
ble 1); although slightly lower, their proportion of correct
forecasts with half-time information (60.0%) was not sig-
nificantly different from their proportion correct before
seeing the half-time scores (62.5%) (Wilcoxon signed
ranks Z = −.81; p>.10).
Although there was no significant change in forecast
accuracy, it is nonetheless possible that the half-time
scores had some impact on the Turkish subjects’ selec-
tions. Accordingly we collated the data so as to directly
investigate whether respondents altered their forecasts
when the half-time cue conflicted with the recognition
cue. Table 3 shows the effect of the half-time information
on subjects’ forecasts for those (388) cases where both (a)
the recognition heuristic was applicable and (b) half-time
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Table 2: Subject mean forecasts for cases where recognition cue was applicable (Experiment 1)]
Familiarity rating
of recognised
team
Mean number of
cases (Total
cases)
Mean number of
cases where
recognised team
is predicted to
win (total cases)
Proportion of
cases where
recognised team
is predicted to
win
Mean confidence
(when choosing
recognised team)
Mean confidence
(when choosing
unrecognised
team
2 4.94 (168) 4.56 (155) 88% 63% 62%
3 3.97 (155) 3.59 (140) 88% 67% 59%
4 3.90 (156) 3.83 (153) 99% 74% 65%
5 3.08 (80) 2.96 (77) 91% 74% 63%
6 2.25 (45) 2.25 (45) 100% 79% --
7 3.93 (58) 3.93 (57) 100% 79% --
2–7 14.39 (662) 13.65 (627) 94% 71% 62%
Table 3: Subjects’ forecast winners of matches with half-time information (cases where recognition cue was used for
initial forecast in Experiment 1). Numbers are frequencies of occurrence.
With ½ time scores
forecast winner
Half-time score conflicts
with recognition
Half-time score concurs
with recognition
Half-time score Level
Recognised 25 117 222
Not recognised 17 0 7
Total 42 117 229
information was presented. There is a clear difference
in the use of recognition when the half-time cue concurs
or conflicts with recognition. When the half-time score
favoured the familiar team, subjects always (117/117) se-
lected the familiar team. However, when the half-time
score favoured the unfamiliar team, respondents selected
the familiar team on only 25/42 (59.5%) of occasions—
a significantly lower proportion than 117/117 (z=−7.28,
p<.001). When the half-time score was equivocal sub-
jects selected the more familiar team on 222 of 229 oc-
casions (97%). Combining the (229) games with equiv-
ocal half-time scores with those (117) where the half-
time score was consistent with recognition creates a set
of (346) cases when the half-time cue did not contra-
dict recognition: subjects decisions were consistent with
the recognition cue on 339/346 (98%) of occasions—
significantly higher than the 25/42 (59.5%) of occasions
when the two cues conflicted (z=−9.77, p<.001). Given
the limited number of observations where the two cues
were in conflict one may wonder howmany of the respon-
dents responded inconsistently with the recognition cue.
Over a third (seventeen) of the 47 subjects made at least
one decision inconsistent with recognition: on the 42 oc-
casions when the cues conflicted 13 subjects made the 17
decisions inconsistent with recognition; when half-time
scores were equivocal 7 subjects (including three of the
13 already noted) made the 7 (of 229) decisions inconsis-
tent with recognition; when the half-time score conflicted
with recognition. Although there is evidence for individ-
ual differences in people’s use of recognition (Gigeren-
zer & Goldstein, 2011), our limited number of responses
make it difficult to infer very much about this beyond the
conclusion that choices inconsistent with recognition are
not attributable to a maverick few.
Although there are relatively few observations where
the recognition cue was antagonistic to the recognition
cue, half-time information clearly had an influence on de-
cisions that respondents could have adjudicated solely by
reference to the recognition cue.
2.2.2 Confidence judgments
Table 1 shows that respondents were somewhat over-
confident; while the judged proportion correct was not
inappropriately high for the English or Turkish respon-
dents without half-time information, mean confidence
was higher than proportion correct, resulting in overconfi-
dence. Table 2 shows that teams with higher rated famil-
iarity are forecast with greater confidence. Across sub-
jects, for those cases where respondents indicated they
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were totally unfamiliar with one of the teams, mean con-
fidence when choosing a recognised team was signif-
icantly higher than when choosing an unfamiliar team
(t(37)=4.26; p<.001). Table 2 shows that, for those cases
where respondents indicated they were totally unfamiliar
with one of the teams, confidence increased as the famil-
iarity of the recognised team increased; the mean of the
individual subject correlations between confidence and
familiarity for the other team is 0.381 (p<.001). This find-
ing is consistent with research by Koehler (1996), which
established that a simple model that associates a single
strength value with each team can accurately account for
the probability judgments of the outcomes of basketball
matches made by basketball fans.
We also studied the effects of the half-time informa-
tion on the confidence judgments. As shown in Ta-
ble 2, mean confidence increased significantly (Z=−4.49,
p<.001) with half-time information and, as performance
was somewhat lower, overconfidence was substantially
and significantly (Z=−4.32, p<.001) higher. We also con-
ducted paired difference t-tests on those cases when the
recognized team was predicted to win both before and af-
ter the half-time scores were given. Comparing the proba-
bilities given for the same cases before and after the half-
time scores were provided across all subjects we found
that, when half-time scores concurred with recognition,
forecast confidence increased significantly (t(116)=7.27,
p<.001); but when the half-time scores conflicted with
recognition, forecast confidence decreased significantly
(t(24)=4.54, p<.001). Thus, not only are subjects’ fore-
casts of which team will win affected by more than just
recognition, but the confidence with which the forecasts
are made also appears to be influenced in a compensatory
fashion by other information.
Given Marewski, Gaissmaier, Schooler, Goldstein, and
Gigerenzer’s (2010) recent challenge to researchers to
specify a model that out-predicts the recognition heuris-
tic, and given that, despite the evidence for compen-
satory effects, the recognition heuristic predicted better
than several alternative compensatory models, it would
be interesting to conduct similar model comparisons. As
these authors acknowledge it is possible that, although a
person always chooses recognized alternatives over un-
recognized ones, she still integrates knowledge into her
decisions. For instance, rather than affecting decisions,
such an integration of knowledge could result in reduced
confidence.
2.3 Discussion
Our results show that decisions based on recognition of
one team and ignorance of the other can be surprisingly
effective; use of the recognition cue by the Turkish re-
spondents was not only very frequently utilised—it also
enabled them to achieve forecasting success comparable
to the more knowledgeable English respondents. These
findings exemplify the claim of proponents of the “fast-
and-frugal” framework that so-called “one reason deci-
sion making” can be ecologically rational—i.e., simple
heuristics can exploit structures of information in the
environment (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research
Group, 1999). The forecasting success of the Turkish
forecasters with very little knowledge is not so readily
explicable by other approaches to decision making (see
Yates, McDaniel & Brown’s 1991 study showing experts
making inferior predictions of stock prices to novices).
However, in contrast to Goldstein and Gigerenzer
(2002), we did not find support for the notion that
recognition-based decision-making is non-compensatory
for given information. Indeed, we found that people do
not rely exclusively on recognition when additional in-
formation is available. When presented with half-time
scores, respondents used this information and, when it
conflicted with recognition, significantly reduced their
use of the recognition cue. This use of information not
only affected the simple binary choices of respondents
regarding which team would win but also the confidence
with which they made their choices.
Several years ago, a reviewer of an earlier draft of
this paper argued that this experiment did not properly
test for recognition heuristic usage because it tests a case
where, by definition, the recognition heuristic cannot be
applied. According to this reviewer’s argument, when
the half-time scores are presented, there was information
about both the recognised and unrecognised teams and
therefore Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s (2002) definition of
“unrecognised” (“no knowledge of an object because one
has never heard, smelled, touched, tasted, or seen it be-
fore” p. 77) is not met. (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011,
made the same point). Although it might be countered
that recognition of the names would precede any evalua-
tion of the half-time information, we decided to conduct a
further experiment where recognition and the opportunity
for consulting additional information were clearly segre-
gated such that respondents could make a decision on the
basis of recognition without any other knowledge being
present, or, alternatively, choose to consult additional in-
formation. Eliciting only one forecast also reduces the
possibility of recognition acquired in the experimental
context affecting the results.
Our next experiment tests whether respondents search
for additional information when one object is recognised
and the other is not.
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3 Experiment 2
This experiment utilised a single group of respondents
who, like Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s (2002) American
students judging German cities, would have limited ex-
perience of the items they were asked to judge. We again
asked respondents to rate the familiarity of a series of
soccer teams and then forecast the winner of a series of
knockout cup matches. In this experiment respondents
had the option of seeking additional information (half-
time scores) before making their predictions but were not
able to inspect any additional information unless they ex-
plicitly sought it.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Design materials and subjects
A single group of 17 subjects (16 females and 1 male)
was recruited to take part in this experiment; all were un-
dergraduate students at the City University in London.
The soccer matches selected consisted of 44 knock-out
cup matches from several different (non-U.K.) countries.
We deliberately selected these so as to include soccer
teams that would be unfamiliar to our respondents. The
experiment used a computer program to present a series
of soccer matches that we asked respondents to predict
the winner of. All matches appeared individually in a
random order generated differently for each respondent.
3.1.2 Procedure
The experiment took place in two phases—both pre-
sented via computer-controlled screens. In the first phase
all subjects first rated the 88 team/city names for recogni-
tion. All the teams in this recognition test were presented
singly in random order and respondents were instructed
to rate the items from 1 (no familiarity with the team or
the city or town that often makes up part of soccer team
names name) to 7 (very familiar).
Following the rating of recognition the 44 matches
with the two team names side by side were presented in
random order. For each match subjects were instructed to
mouse-click on the team they thought had won the match.
All subjects made their forecasts after the games had ac-
tually taken place (they did not know the results) with the
option of inspecting the half-time score. Displayed be-
tween the two team names was a graphic box titled “half-
time score”. If subjects chose to predict the match out-
come without additional information then they could ig-
nore the half-time score button, but, if they wished to use
the half-time score to make their predictions, they could
click on the box to reveal it.
After clicking on a team subjects then used a 50%-
100% confidence scale to rate their confidence that their
prediction was correct. The task was self paced.
3.2 Results and discussion
The familiarity ratings confirmed that our respondents
had very limited knowledge of the events being fore-
cast; 44.8% (670 of the 1496 [88 x 17]) of teams were
rated as completely unfamiliar. Familiar (rating >1) and
completely unfamiliar (rating =1) teams were paired to-
gether such that the recognition heuristic was applicable
for 38.2% (286) of the 748 (44 matches x 17 respon-
dents) forecast matches. Nonetheless, before forecasting
the match winner, respondents actively sought additional
information for a clear majority of these events; for those
(286) cases where recognition could determine the issue
respondents sought half-time information in 68.5% (196)
of them. Given that there was no penalty associated with
use of the half-time scores one might wonder why respon-
dents did not consult this information more often. How-
ever, although there was no explicit cost for seeking the
additional information there is plainly some cost in terms
of time and effort to process this information, which may
explain why respondents did not always seek it. With
half-time scores respondents decided consistently with
the recognition cue on 61.2% of occasions (120 times);
the remaining 38.8% (76 times) they decided inconsis-
tently with recognition. Where respondents did not seek
half-time information (90 occasions) respondents used
recognition on a similar proportion (61%, 55 times) of
occasions.
Prediction accuracy was well above chance—73.8% of
all (748) match predictions were correct. For those 286
cases where the recognition heuristic was applicable (one
team was familiar another was totally unfamiliar) accu-
racy was 72.7%; for the 175 cases where the recognition
heuristic was applicable and predictions were in line with
it accuracy was 91.4%. Accuracy was below chance—
43.2%—for those 111 cases where the heuristic was ap-
plicable but predictions went against recognition. For the
(196) predictions that could be resolved by recognition
but were also informed by half-time score information
accuracy was 77.6%. A paired samples t-test compar-
ing the performance of subjects on items where recogni-
tion was applicable when they inspected half-time scores
against performance when they didn’t inspect half-time
scores showed a significant improvement in performance
across individuals when they used half-time information
(t(16)=2.90, p=0.01).
As with Experiment 1, we examined how half-time
information affected subject forecasts—on those occa-
sions when respondents chose to inspect it. Table 4
shows that when the half-time score concurred with the
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Table 4: Subjects’ forecast winners of matches with half-time information (cases where recognition cue was applicable
and additional information was sought in Experiment 2). Numbers are frequencies of occurrence.
With ½ time scores
forecast winner
Half-time score conflicts
with recognition
Half-time score concurs
with recognition
Half-time score Level
Recognised 2 38 80
Not Recognised 32 18 26
Total 34 56 106
recognition heuristic—i.e., favoured the same team—
respondents used the recognition cue on most—38 of
the 56—occasions; however, when the half-time score
conflicted with the recognition heuristic—i.e., the two
cues pointed in different directions—respondents used
the recognition cue on just 2 of the 34 occasions. These
two proportions 38/56 and 2/34 are significantly different
from each other (z=−8.34, p<.001). Again we examined
how many of the subjects eschewed recognition when
the half-time score was in conflict with it: 15—nearly
all—of our 17 subjects did this at least once, one subject
never experienced an occasion when the two cues were
in conflict and just one subject always utilised recogni-
tion in spite of (three) opportunities to use the half-time
cue. Again it is clear that, even where recognition could
determine the issue, half-time information influenced re-
spondents’ forecasting decisions. However, unlike Ex-
periment 1, in this experiment the additional half-time in-
formation was available at respondents’ discretion. Ac-
cordingly we conclude that this experiment demonstrates
that, when one team was recognized and the other was
not, then the inference was not always determined by
recognition; on the contrary, additional information about
the teams was sought on a majority of occasions and in-
deed, where this conflicted with recognition, it often re-
versed the choice that could have been determined by
recognition. Notwithstanding Gigerenzer and Goldstein’s
(2011) recent qualifications, one could argue that this
finding is inconsistent with Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s
(2002) original characterisation of the recognition heuris-
tic and their finding that recognition is noncompensatory
for given information—although one difference between
our studies is that Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) did
not provide what Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2011) call
cue information about unrecognized objects and we did.
4 General discussion
Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s (2002) test of noncompen-
satory inferences found that people do not compensate
recognition with other information. Why do we find a
compensating influence of conflicting information while
Goldstein and Gigerenzer did not? One possibility is that
Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s test for compensatory effects
was weaker than it appears. Below we argue that their
mode of presenting the conflicting information may have
undermined its impact and that the diagnosticity of the
conflicting information was very low.
Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s (2002) evidence came
from an experiment using the German city sizes task
conducted on American student subjects. They were in-
formed that, after a training phase, they would be tested
on pairs of cities drawn from the 30 largest in Germany.
They instructed their subjects (as a recited fact) that,
among the 30 biggest German cities, the 9 cities with soc-
cer teams in the top league (the German “Bundesliga”)
are larger than the 21 without in 78% of all possible pairs.
They then told subjects specific information about 8 “well
known” cities drawn from the set of 30. Although the
subjects believed that that they were sampling 8 cities
at random, all subjects were given the same names of
4 “well known” cities with a soccer team and 4 “well-
known” cities without a soccer team.5
After this training phase Goldstein and Gigerenzer
(2002) presented their subjects with pairs of cities and
asked them to select the bigger of each pair. The critical
test focused on pairs where subjects recognised one city
but knew it did not have a soccer team but did not recog-
nize the other city (which may or may not have had a soc-
cer team). The logic of this contrast is that, as the recog-
nised city does not have a soccer team but the unrecog-
nised one may, a subject who did not place any value at all
on recognition should select the city which might have a
soccer team over the one which they knew did not. Note
that the role of recognition was never mentioned to the
subjects and that all instruction concerned soccer teams.
In Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s (2002) study the over-
whelming majority of such decisions were consistent
with the use of recognition. Twelve of 21 subjects made
predictions entirely in accord with recognition and most
other subjects deviated on only a few occasions. Overall
92% of the decisions made when conflicting cues were
given were consistent with recognition.
5These were cities that they later indicated that they had heard of
prior to the test.
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While the test of the use of recognition when faced
with conflicting information appears to impressively af-
firm the dominant power of recognition there are some
grounds to doubt it. Firstly, there is a kind of con-
flict within the information presented during the train-
ing phase. While subjects were explicitly instructed that
cities with soccer teams are bigger than those without on
78% of occasions, their experience with what they be-
lieved was a random sample of eight of the 30 biggest
cities might well have created a rather different impres-
sion. They had studied eight cities during the training
session and knew four that did not have soccer teams and
four that did. These eight cities were selected by Gold-
stein and Gigerenzer because they (correctly) anticipated
they would be recognised by American students—they
were “well known” cities. Imagine then, in spite of being
instructed that cities with soccer teams are bigger than
those without on 78% of occasions, the effect of discov-
ering that, among a putatively random selection of eight
cities, all of which they happened to recognise and so
would presumably assume are larger cities, half didn’t
have a soccer team. If having a soccer team was strongly
diagnostic of city size one might expect a greater prepon-
derance of cities one recognised to have soccer teams.
In any event, whatever the respondents’ expectations, the
experience of discovering that half of the sample of eight
well known—and therefore presumably large—cities did
not have soccer teams might well have reduced the in-
fluence of the soccer team statistic below the level the
explicit instructions were designed to invoke. Alterna-
tively, given assurances that the soccer team information
was correct and a $15 prize for correctness, respondents
might have lowered their estimate of recognition validity,
rather than the soccer team cue6—though which, if either,
effect occurred remains unclear.
The Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) study on cue
conflict thereby conflates two bits of information with
two types of information. Subjects were instructed with a
summary statistic about the validity of the soccer team as
a cue to city size—but then experienced information that
could undermine any sense they have of this.
A number of authors claim that there is a differential
effect of experienced information relative to instructed in-
formation. Koehler (1995) argued that the way in which
base rate information is learned affects the way decision-
makers use this information; specifically, when base rates
are directly experienced through trial-by-trial outcome
feedback, their impact on judgments increases. Spellman,
(1993; 1996) also found that when base rates are learned
in an experiential manner subjects show better base-rate
use. Gigerenzer, Hell and Blank (1988) argued that a rea-
son for observed variations in use of base-rate informa-
6We thank Dan Goldstein for this suggestion
tion in probabilistic judgment is the different influence
that varying types of information have. In their studies
using Kahneman and Tversky’s (1973) famous engineer-
lawyer problem Gigerenzer et al. replicated the classic
base-rate neglect finding with a verbal presentation where
base-rates were asserted. However, when their subjects
directly experienced the base-rates themselves (via sam-
pling experience rather than being instructed) base-rate
neglect disappeared and subjects clearly used the base-
rates in a proper fashion.
Such results suggest that instructing subjects that all
the cities they would be seeing were among the 30 largest
in Germany and that, of these 30, the 9 cities with soc-
cer teams are larger than the 21 other cities in 78% of all
possible pairs may well not enable subjects to exploit this
information effectively—particularly if it is somewhat at
odds with experienced information. The same informa-
tion might be utilised if it was learned through direct ex-
perience. Newell and (2004) also criticised Goldstein and
Gigerenzer’s (2002) study for not allowing respondents to
learn about the soccer club information incrementally in-
stead of relying on subjects unproven ability to integrate
information about percentages provided at training into
their test decisions.
In our experiments we assumed that there was no such
problem with the two bits of conflicting information—the
conflicting information is presumably well understood:
even those with no knowledge of English soccer teams
will appreciate that a team leading at half-time has an ad-
vantage over its opponent. And, although in our study
we were unable to say anything precise about the diag-
nostic value of the half-time information—we offered our
subjects no advice about this—advice is not necessary in
order to test whether or not it had any influence on judg-
ment, which it plainly did.
In Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s (2002) study it is not
clear that the diagnosticity of the conflicting informa-
tion was sufficient to over-ride the recognition cue, even
if subjects had integrated it into their decisions. Bröder
and Eichler (2006) argue that, for the critical test items in
Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s (2002) study, where respon-
dents had to choose between a city they recognised but
knew didn’t have a soccer team and a city they didn’t
recognise but might have a football team, the actual pre-
dictive success rate of the soccer cue was much lower
than 78%. As there is only a 5 in 22 chance that the un-
recognised city has a soccer team (they knew 9 of the 30
cities had a soccer team and knew the identities of four
of the cities which did and four which did not) Bröder
and Eichler calculated the predictive success rate of the
soccer team cue is only 0.56 relative to the estimated va-
lidity of recognition of 0.80.7 Arguably the predictive
7Bröder and Eichler’s (2006) “Predictive success rate” is not the
same as cue validity but reflects the fact that, for the clear majority
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success of the soccer team cue is even lower than 0.56.
Subjects would be entitled to infer that the chance that an
unrecognised city had a soccer team was less than 5 in 22
if they understood that the two cues are likely to be inter-
correlated such that cities they did not recognise are less
likely to have soccer teams than cities that they did recog-
nise. As a result an inference that unrecognised cities are
even less likely to have soccer teams would be justified.
Accordingly Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s (2002) re-
sult that recognition appeared to be used in a non-
compensatory fashion may not be due to any special sta-
tus accorded to recognition: not because people didn’t
use other information but rather because, in this spe-
cific situation, recognition simply outweighed the soc-
cer cue. With these cue values, decision strategies
as diverse as multiple regression or recognition-based
decision-making would lead to the same outcome.
In our experiments we found that subjects were more
likely to forecast a team to win when additional infor-
mation was consistent with recognition than when it was
not. Although Goldstein and Gigerenzer found that 92%
of decisions made with conflicting information were in
accord with the recognition cue they did not report the
proportion of decisions made when the two bits of infor-
mation were not conflicting. Nevertheless, in a replica-
tion of Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s experiment, Newell
and Fernandez (2006) found that subjects were signifi-
cantly more likely to choose the recognized city when it
was also known to have a soccer team than when it was
known not to have a soccer team.
The data we present here confirm the impressive power
of decisions based on recognition. However, our exper-
iments indicate that recognition based decisions can be
influenced by other information. Although our experi-
ments avoid criticisms made of other studies by Pachur et
al., the half-time scores are “givens”—presented informa-
tion rather than information drawn frommemory—which
deviates from the memory-based test setting emphasised
by Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2011). Nonetheless, our
consideration of the evidence leads us to doubt the basis
for the suggestion that “. . . no other information can re-
verse the choice determined by recognition” (Goldstein
& Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 82).
In more recent writings the notion that the recognition
heuristic is invoked whenever recognition can discrimi-
nate has been qualified. Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2011
p. 105) write: “We do not assume that people follow the
recognition heuristic unconditionally”, arguing that two
processes, recognition and evaluation guide the adaptive
of critical pairs, the unrecognized city would actually have no soccer
team (an expected 17 out of every 22 cases). Hence using the soccer
team cue on these cases would, by definition because the cue does not
discriminate them, produce correct inferences only 50% of the time.
The success rate would be 78% only for those (5 out of every 22) cases
where the unknown city had a football team.
selection of the recognition heuristic. Gigerenzer and
Goldstein (2011) devote a section of their article to the
evaluation process and give some criteria for selection
of the heuristic; nevertheless, Gigerenzer and Goldstein
(2011) concede that how the evaluation process works is
not yet well understood. Some significant questions arise
about how the evaluation process operates (see Newell,
2011) and also render testing of the recognition heuris-
tic more difficult: how can we know if the recognition
heuristic was applied in any case? Are inferences incon-
sistent with the recognition heuristic evidence against it
or merely evidence that it was not invoked?
Gigerenzer and Goldstein’s (2011) recent statement
that “[w]e personally have no doubts that recognition is
sometimes dealt with in a compensatory way, especially
when the ecology favors doing so” (p. 110) appears to un-
dermine the significance of our findings—but only at the
expense of some of the advertised virtues of the recog-
nition heuristic, namely simplicity and testability. Gold-
stein and Gigerenzer’s (2002, p. 88) claim that fast and
frugal heuristics are better formulated than representa-
tiveness and availability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974)
because they “. . . allow one to make quantifiable and
testable predictions, and avoid possible misunderstanding
(or mystification) of the processes involved, even if they
do sacrifice some of the allure of the unknown” looks less
persuasive than it once did.
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